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Abstract There is visible upswing in India−Japan ties. Favoured by history, few
hiccups in the past were quickly overcome and new synergies were found, which are
being exploited now for mutual gains. That is the story of complementarity in the
economic domain that either side has felt necessary to be exploited. Started during the
previous UPA government, bilateral ties have received further momentum by
forward-looking leaderships in either country. The Modi−Abe personal chemistry
has helped the ties to get the much-needed push. This paper, however, raises the
research question if there is any other driver that is pushing both to come closer.
Economic interests being given, the security paradigm and the China factor shall be
examined as the focus of the article.
Key words: Defence, maritime security, nuclear cooperation, Shinkansen, infra-
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Introduction
In recent years, India−Japan relations have emerged as one of the significant
bilateral relationships in the Asia−Pacific region, with either country weighing
heavily on the other in their foreign policy calculus. Since the epoch-making visit of
former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in August 2000 after years of
stagnation, it has grown by leaps and bounds during successive governments in
either country. Though the visit saw the dawn of a new era, some changes in the
economic sphere had already started in 1991−92. For example, in 1991 India was on
the verge of default on foreign debt payments and it was only Japan that provided
emergency ODA to help out until the World Bank/IMF could rescue India a few
months later. The economic and security/strategic components, in particular,
received further boost because of their shared confidence on each other.
Cooperation in the maritime security domain in the wake of Chinaʼs rise and threat
to use of force to assert its claims in disputed areas is another key development in
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the relationships. Bilateral ties scaled a new height after assumption to office by
Abe Shinzo in Japan and Narendra Modi in India. The personal chemistry built by
Modi and Abe also has helped. The earlier governments both in India and Japan
successfully laid the ground on which the current leaderships have worked to build
on. This has been mutually satisfying. The strategic landscape in the Asia Pacific
has undergone visible change with geopolitical power distribution shifting rapidly.
In the wake of this, India−Japan relations have undergone tectonic shifts in
realigning their relationships politically, strategically and economically.
Bilateral relations during the post-War years, in the 1950s, were warm as India
sided with Japan on crucial issues. This created a great deal of warmth in Japan
towards India. As the cold war began and India floated the non-alignment principle
and Japan got allied with the US, both countries drifted apart and the potentials
remained to be exploited for mutual benefits. The next two decades, the 1960s and
1970s, were missed opportunity for both.
The ideological division between the two during the cold war was a visible barrier
to forge a cooperative partnership. Another barrier was Indiaʼs socialistic, inward-
looking economic policies as against Japanʼs preference for export-led growth
strategy. Japanese perception had begun to change after India adopted economic
reforms in 1991 and Look East policy. When Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha
Rao visited Japan in 1992, Japan began to respond by sending senior ministers to
India to assess if India with a potentially huge market was ready to deliver.
Even when India had started this revival by revisiting its foreign policy outlook, the
signs of warmth were abruptly eroded when India detonated a nuclear device in
1998, attracting sharp reactions and sanctions from Japan. The character of bilateral
relations underwent a dramatic change with Moriʼs visit in 2000, which marked a
turning point, ending this temporary hiccup. Successive governments in either
country have persevered to scale up bilateral ties in all spheres since then. The
current phase with Modi and Abe at the helm in India and Japan seems to be the
golden phase. This essay is an in-depth analysis of some of the salient features in
this evolving relationship.
Research questions
What are the drivers that are pushing both towards each other? At the hindsight,
one notices complementarities that are both internal as well as external. The list of
literature available in the public domain in abundance has dissected both these
dimensions. The present authorʼs perspectives in this list of literature are also well-
known. The attempt in this article is not to make a bold claim and a departure from
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this often-chosen path. What this article attempts to do is an in-depth analysis to
examine which of the drivers-external and internal-weigh over the other and how
relevant are they towards each other in the present context. The article would also
assess if the direction in which both are heading is appropriate or if there are gaps
and pitfalls. With this in view, it would attempt to make some policy
recommendations that might be relevant to policy makers in both the countries
from an analytical and academic perspective. The external driver would examine
the geo-strategic dimensions and compulsions faced by both in the wake of Chinaʼs
assertiveness and territorial claims in areas, in particular in the South China Sea,
which is why both find merit to find common grounds to deepen defence
cooperation as well as cooperation in regional forums bilaterally and by co-opting
other regional powers who perceive the same threat from a belligerent China. In
the economic domain, with the Indian economy experiencing sustained growth,
something akin to Japan in the 1960s and early 1970s, coinciding with the stagnating
Japanese economy, makes Japan to see merit to engage India with its economic
development process by increasing trade, investment and collaborative joint
projects. This process has unearthed huge opportunity for mutual gain. This article
aims to examine some of the recent trends in this front as well. The commitment to
cooperate in the nuclear issue despite huge domestic hurdles in Japan is another
issue that would be touched upon. The deal on nuclear cooperation reached during
Modiʼs visit to Japan in November 2016 is termed “historic”.
Defence Cooperation
Defence cooperation between the two countries has remained steady. While it is felt
not necessary to repeat the kind and scale it has developed till Modiʼs visit to Japan
in 2014 on which literature is available in plenty, the kind of agreement that was
reached on how to boost defence cooperation when Abe visited India in December
2015 is worth-analysing. On this, two pacts, including an agreement concerning
Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology cooperation, and Security
Measures for Protection of Classified Military Information were signed. These two
agreements provide a framework to “enhance defence and security cooperation by
making available to each other, defence equipment and technology necessary to
implement joint research, development and/or production project or projects ”.
These are decisive steps in security cooperation between the two and would
deepen the defence relations and promote defence manufacturing in India.
It was also agreed to expand staff talks by all three wings of the Armed Forces and
make Japan a partner in the Malabar Naval Exercises on a regular basis, a shift
from the earlier practice when it was not a regular feature. Such an arrangement
conjures a competitive picture in the Indo−Pacific region. The India−US−Japan
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Trilateral dialogue at the foreign minister level again sends a message to China that
its fast growing domination of Asia−Pacific region with intention to extend its
strategic space is not viewed kindly in the rest of Asia. This sends a sense of
discomfort. The two sides decided to begin Air Force-to-Air Force staff talks as
well.
The Indian Defence Ministry has finalised to purchase 12 Japanese-designed,
Japanese-built US−2 amphibious search-and-rescue aircraft from manufacturer
ShinMaywa Industries worth $1. 5 to $1. 6 billion1. This would help beef up the
Naval wing of Indiaʼs defence. When done, this would be one of Tokyoʼs first arms
deals since Japan lifted its 50−year ban on weapons exports in 2014. So far Japan
has struggled to break into the industry. Though Japan was the leading contender
to build Australiaʼs next generation of submarines-that countryʼs largest-ever
defense contract-but lost out to a French bid in April 2016. There could also be
prospects for the two countries to graduate to the next level to jointly produce the
aircraft in India.
This proposal seems to be quite ambitious as there are reservations in some quarter
as to how these expensive seaplanes, if procured, can be fitted into Indiaʼs naval
tactics (not strategy). Even though Japan has lifted restrictions on arms exports,
there are critics who complain that Japan wants to put on table on offer military
equipment that might be irrelevant to its potential buyers while holding back the
ones with utility value. This is just not true. The quick response capability of the
US−2 seaplanes to hit the targets in critical zone with precision (maximum four
hours) makes its hugely relevant, adding teeth to the Indian Navy2.
In recognition of Japanʼs technological advantages and decision to relax its rules on
weapons exports, India has also taken steps to purchase Japanʼs Soryu-class diesel-
electric submarines to add to its fleet of fifteen already in possession. If India does
indeed buy this product, it would be further an acknowledgment that Japanʼs
product is far superior3.
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1 “Japan, India likely to ink pivotal US−2 aircraft deal”, The Japan Times, 6 November 2016, http:
//www. japantimes. co. jp/news/2016/11/06/national/japan-india-likely-ink-pivotal-us-2-aircraft-deal/#.
WB_il_p95PY; Rajat Pandit, “India revives project to acquire Japanese US−2i amphibious aircraft worth
Rs 10, 000 crore”, 5 November 2016, The Economic Times, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
Move-to-buy-Japanese-planes-gathers-steam/articleshow/55254397.cms?intenttarget=no&utm_source=
newsletter&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=Top_Headlines
2 This is what a senior naval officer, since retired, told the author in a recent casual discussion on the
issue.
3 Milton Ezrati, “Asiaʼs Odd Couple: India and Japan Join Forces”, 14 December 2015, January-
February 2016, http: //nationalinterest. org/feature/asias-odd-couple-india-japan-join-forces-14599?
page=4
Besides the military-to-military cooperation and the Malabar exercises, in a bid to
strengthen joint operating procedures, a joint exercise between the Indian and
Japanese Coast Guards was held in the Bay of Bengal off Chennai on 15 January
2016
4. During this exercise, Japanese Coast Guard Ship Echigo visited Chennai from
11 to 16 January. ʻSahyog-Kaijin-XVʼ, the joint exercise encompassed the scenario of
hijacking a merchant vessel and its subsequent rescue in a combined Coast Guard
operation of both countries. Operation of Indian Coast Guard helicopters from Japan
Coast Guard ship and vice versa, cross-deck landing, interdiction of pirate vessel,
cross boarding, SAR demonstration and external fire fighting were other highlights
of the exercise. In addition, the Indian Coast Guard ships and aircraft demonstrated
their prowess before the Japanese delegation.
Regional and global Issues
The joint statement that was issued in December 2015 titled ʻIndia and Japan Vision
2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and
Prosperity of the Indo−Pacific Region and the Worldʼ. This signifies that
India−Japan relations no longer remain confined to purely bilateral issues but has
expanded to assume a regional and global dimension in which both countries would
address issues with a common voice. Both the leaders also discussed regional and
international issues of mutual importance and resolved to work together for the
early realization of UN reforms, particularly the Security Council reform, to better
reflect the realities of the international community in the 21st century. Other issues
that both leaders agreed to work together are on climate change, terrorism and
North Koreaʼs contentious nuclear program and expressed concern over its
continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs,
including its uranium enrichment activities. They urged North Korea to fully
comply with its international obligations and address at the earliest the abduction
issue. Abe supported Indiaʼs membership of the APEC. Both resolved to work
together in East Asia Summit to promote an inclusive, balanced and open regional
architecture and maritime security in the region. Both the leaders reiterated their
resolve “for ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded
maritime commerce”. They observed that disputes must be resolved peacefully and
that all countries must abide by international law and norms on maritime issues.”
It was also agreed that India would offer full support to augment capabilities of
Japanʼs newly-created intelligence unit. Though Japan has not played any
significant role in global counter-terror initiatives so far, Japanese nationals have
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//www.deccanherald.com/content/522394/indo-japan-joint-coast-guard.html
been targeted recently in certain countries in Asia by Islamic State and other
extremist groups5. Because of Japanʼs huge economic presence in such countries,
Japanese nationals stationed there face security risks. By agreeing to cooperate on
this, India and Japan have scaled another frontier in their relationships.
Maritime Security
Securing maritime commerce in the Indian Ocean region and larger Asia−Pacific is
a new narrative in India−Japan bilateral ties. Being a resource deficient country,
Japan is heavily dependent on import of critical resources as well as for export of
finished goods and therefore safe maritime commerce is critical for Japan. This was
again, as before, underscored in the 44-paragraph “Joint Statement on India and
Japan Vision 2025”. The dramatic rise of China coinciding with the relative decline
of the US has brought in new challenge in the strategic equation in the Asia Pacific
region. This is being accentuated by unilateral action by China on certain regional
issues with the intent to extend its strategic space. Such an approach is adversely
impacting the economic and security interests of many Asian countries. India and
Japan stand together to confront this new situation. No wonder, Chinese media
dubbed Abeʼs visit to India as an attempt to contain China6.
There is huge merit for India and Japan to cooperate. India−Japan cooperation
could be in two fronts: capacity building and burden sharing. While the former
could entail economic cooperation, maritime security, the latter could mean military
modernization. Some partner countries of both India and Japan such as Vietnam,
the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, etc. face critical security dilemma in the wake
of Chinaʼs assertiveness. Since their capacity to cope with this new challenge is
limited, they need the help of both India and Japan. It puts enormous responsibility
and challenge to both India and Japan on how to keep China engaged so that China
does not cross its limits. This does not mean to suggest that either needs to adopt a
sugar-coating strategy towards China or confront in any belligerent way.
India worries about Chinaʼs close military and nuclear links with Pakistan. China not
only provided Pakistan with military hardware but also supplied nuclear capable
M-11 missile way back in 1991. In turn, Pakistanʼs nuclear links with North Korea in
exchange for missiles in the 1990s is well known. Pakistanʼs role in North Koreaʼs
nuclear weapon program is a worry for Japan, as is Pakistan for India. This provides
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5 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India to train Japanʼs counter-terror intelligence unit”, The Economic
Times, 14 December 2015, http: //economictimes. indiatimes. com/news/defence/india-to-train-japans-
counter-terror-intelligence-unit/articleshow/50165680.cms
6 “Abeʼs India Visit part of Plan to Contain China-Chinese Media”, Deccan Herald, 11 December 2015,
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/516841/abes-india-visit-part-plan.html
common challenge to both India and Japan7.
Developments in the past few years in the South China Sea, particularly Chinese
activities, have raised concerns. The maritime lanes have been threatened and
there have been frequent skirmishes that impact international commerce. China
has made military installations in some of the islands, adding to the tensions. There
are fears that maritime commerce could be jeopardized, leaving debilitating
consequences to the economies of Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and many
others. There are nearly nine countries which make competing claims to some parts
or the other of the South China Sea as their own while China claims the Sea in its
entirety. Chinaʼs claims are dubious if historical records are evaluated objectively.
Even though China is a signatory to the UN Conference on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS), it has refused to abide by it. Of all the claimants, Vietnam and the
Philippines have taken umbrage against Chinaʼs claims. The Philippines took the
issue to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration and got a judgement in its favour in
July 2016. Beijing has rejected this. The tribunal does not have enforcing authority
and Beijing know this. Though China has pronounced time and again that none of
its actions would affect international shipping, it has made the South China Sea as
one of its “core interests”, implying that it reserves the right to use military option
to protect its “core interests”8. “This is gun powder keg and there is no visible
guarantee that the situation will not change”9.
China is equally uncomfortable that India is getting cozy with Japan and other
ASEAN nations on the South China Sea issue10. Reacting to Abeʼs visit to India,
Chinese ambassador to India Le Yucheng remarked that “India should ensure that
initiatives like the trilateral maritime agreement or defence ties with other
countries are conducive for peaceful and stable Asia−Pacific region”. This was a
clear warning to India, which India and Japan need to take note11. China rejects any
power questioning its claim in totality over the South China Sea. Such a situation
demands even more close cooperation between the two countries to coordinate
future policy choices12.
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Maritime security is so critical for Japan that the 97−year-old former Prime
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro launched the “Nakasone Initiative” in December 2015
during an international symposium by the Institute for International Policy Studies,
where he serves as chairman. In the wake of Chinaʼs maritime advances, the
initiative described security and freedom in the East and South China Seas as
“preconditions for peace and prosperity in the world,” since the area serves as a
major artery for global trading. To guarantee freedom of the seas, the initiative
called for all parties concerned to abide by international laws and codes of conduct
and exercise self-restraint, refraining from unilateral actions that exacerbate
distrust and cause tensions among them13. Nakasone urged all parties concerned to
establish a code of conduct on the South China Sea at the earliest possible date, as
well as boost cooperation in the areas of marine resource management,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Besides the need for relevant
organizations to improve maritime domain awareness, Nakasone called for adopting
a charter on maritime security on East Asia so that countries concerned both in and
outside the region could confirm rules and targets for a comprehensive approach.
As a major means to promote maritime security in the region, the Nakasone
Initiative proposed the establishment of an Organization for Maritime Security in
East Asia ( OMSEA ), taking as a model the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe14. The aim of the proposed OMSEA is to provide a
permanent and open forum for member countries and other parties concerned to
exchange information and opinions on maritime security. It would also aim to
gather data from an objective standpoint so that this could be shared among
members. If institutionalized, India can have an important role in this organization
and help deepen India−Japan cooperation in the maritime domain.
Shinkanshen project
Infrastructure development is sine qua non if the economic growth needs to be
sustained. The government in India has realized this and improving the countryʼs
infrastructure is therefore a priority. It was therefore both Modi and Abe stressed
its importance in the joint statement. Therefore, a slew of agreements in the
economic and defence fields were reached. Over a dozen agreements were inked of
which three stands out: introduction of Japanʼs High Speed Railways ( HSR )
technologies (the Shinkansen system or the Bullet train) to the Mumbai-Ahmeda-
bad route, civil nuclear cooperation and transfer of defence equipment and
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check”, The Japan Times, 14 December 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/14/
national/politics-diplomacy/japan-picked-china-build-indias-high-speed-rail-link-15-billion-deal/
13 “Nakasone Launches Maritime Security Initiative ”, The Yimouri Shimbun, 16 December 2015,
http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002628162
14 Ibid.
technology cooperation. Among other concrete outcomes is reaffirmation of the
commitment made by Abe in 2014 during Modiʼs visit to Japan to inject a massive
$34 billion over the next five years. But for the Japanese firms to follow through
investment commitment made by Abe, they need a predictable tax and regulatory
regime to which Modi committed. Like most businesses in the West, the Japanese
want certainty and predictability. The Goods and Services Tax legislation was
stuck in the Parliament logjam but has not been sorted out to go through
parliamentary procedure. When done, it would facilitate the smooth entry of
Japanese firms to the Indian market. This would be the biggest tax reform since
independence as GST would bring the entire country into a single tax structure and
therefore would be welcome to foreign investors.
The important deal was on the introduction of Japanʼs high speed train known for
its speed, reliability and safety on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad route. Japan made a
commitment for an extraordinary package of approximately $12 billion and
technical assistance on easy terms. Modi observed: “This enterprise will launch a
revolution in Indian railways and speed up Indiaʼs journey into the future. It will
become an engine of economic transformation in India.” Bullet train between the
two cities will cut travel time on the 505-km route from eight hours to around three.
The approximate cost of the project is estimated to be around Rs. 98, 000 crore
(1. 47 trillion Yen ) to begin in 2017 and be put to service in 2023. Though the
introduction of the bullet train is an ambitious project, it is a small but important
platform for future modernization of the Indian railways. Both Modi and Abe
recognized that if Indiaʼs growth story is sustained, Indiaʼs transport and
communications ought to match world standard15.
In the late 1990s, Japan succeeded in exporting its bullet-train technology to
Taiwan, but lost out to China in October 2015 in the competition to sell the
technology to Indonesia. India put priority on the safety and technological
advantage of the Shinkansen system. Having won the project over China, Japan
now needs to support India in the training of personnel, including operation
controllers, drivers and maintenance workers, in addition to the export of hardware.
Well known for its character, Chinese official media mentioned that the India−Japan
deal came through because both wanted to corner China, forgetting to mention that
it had beaten Japan on a bid when it won the Indonesian high speed railway project.
Beijing does not value the merit of fair competition. This is typical of Chinese
character and therefore unfortunate.
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The project received the approval of the Cabinet and to be executed under the
provisions of the existing Railway Act, 1989. This excuses Railways from having to
go to Parliament to enact a law for high-speed train. This saves the project from
possible delays due to parliamentary procedures. Moreover, it has been understood
that giving states a stake in the project was essential for success. A new
organisation, created out of a Centre-state joint venture like the DMRC, will
implement the project with Japanʼs assistance16.
A three-member empowered committee comprising chairman, Railway Board and
secretaries of Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, and Department of
Expenditure, will take the necessary decisions after discussions with the Japanese.
This model of execution is going to set the template to be followed by all the
subsequent bullet-train corridors in the Diamond Quadrilateral. Not only is Japan
giving 81 per cent of the Rs 98, 000 crore project at just 0. 1 per cent, negotiators
from Railways have ensured that the deal is much more sweeter than it had in the
case of Dedicated Freight Corridor, which had many restrictive strings attached for
India. This is the first of several projects that are part of Modiʼs innovation drive in
the country17.
Besides being cheaper, the bullet train loan gives India freedom to carry out civil
construction sans Japanese participation-a crucial change to ensure speedy award
of tenders and fast execution unlike in the DFC. For the first time, Japan has agreed
to distinguish between civil and system contracts. System contracts are those
involving installation of signalling system, key safety apparatus, rolling stock etc.
India will buy the entire rolling stock from Japan-the new version of the
Shinkansen-while Japan insisted that certain “prime contractors” from Japan are a
must in the system contracts which are crucial for safety features like the
Shinkansen.
These features of the assistance significantly lower the monetary impact of the
clause that 30 per cent of the sourcing should be done from Japan. The grace period
of the 50−year loan is 15 years and Japan has agreed to partner in areas like setting
up technical training centres for skills upgrade. Around Rs. 70, 000 crore is the cost
of construction, while Rs 6, 000 crore has been worked out as eventual cost of rolling
stock (the trains).
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16 Mahendra Singh, “Railways fast-tracks Mum bullet train project, sets up co”, Times of India, 4
January 2016. http: //timesofindia. indiatimes. com/india/Railways-fast-tracks-Mumbai-Ahmedabad-
bullet-train-project-sets-up-separate-company/articleshow/50432014.cms
17 Ruchika Chitravanshi, “Indo−Japan bullet train deal: First victory for PM Modiʼs Innovation Panel”,
TheEconomic Times, 23 December 2016. http: //articles. economictimes. indiatimes. com/
2015-12-23/news/69261440_1_road-sector-projects-bullet-pm-modi
To further pitch the bullet train technology to India, Modi joined Abe to take a joint
Shinkansen ride from Tokyo to Kobe during his visit to Japan in November 2016,
during which both the leaders also visited Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd.ʼs plant
in the city to see the production of the E5 Series for the Hayabusa trains on the
Tohoku Shinkansen Line, which links Tokyo and Shin-Aomori18.
There are other flagship projects as well in which Japanese ODA has been
meaningfully used. In fact, Japanese ODA has played a big role in India−Japan
economic relations. In the late 1950s, Japan started its ODA to Asian countries with
India as the first recipient. Ever since, it has been a major source of ODA to India.
Since the late 1980s Japan has been Indiaʼs biggest ODA provider and, since 2000,
Japanese ODA has made India its biggest recipient. The Delhi Metro, the Dedicated
Freight Corridors, the on-going Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, the Chennai-
Bengaluru Industrial Corridor are some of the big-ticket projects where the ODA
money is being used. These are visible projects to make Indiaʼs ʻMake in Indiaʼ
vision a real success. Earlier, there were equally impressive ODA projects such as
Vizag Outer Harbour, Bombay High Deep Sea Drilling Rig (pictured on Indian
postage stamp), Cochin Shipyard modernization, fertiliser factories for Indiaʼs Green
Revolution etc., apart from the 1991 emergency aid. Over 1, 000 Japanese companies
have already opened offices in India and this number is poised to increase as both
expand their economic horizons. This number, however, is too small compared to
the number of Japanese companies doing business in China despite the politically
strained relations between the two neighbours.
Trade and Investment Issue
Though bilateral ties look robust in other fronts, the economic link remains rather
weak. In 2012−2013, bilateral trade totalled only $18 billion, too small compared to
China and the US. Indeed, in the past three years, this has also declined. While India
accounts for a minuscule 1 per cent of Japanʼs total trade, Japan accounts only 2. 5
per cent of Indiaʼs total trade. This is an aberration that both need to rectify by
effectively using the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that both
signed in 2011. Further details are beyond the scope of this paper and reserved for
another article.
In the investment area, Japan ranks fourth (RBI data says 3rd) among investors in
India but with only 7 per cent of the total. There are some discrepancies in data
released by the Reserve Bank of India and the Department of Industrial Policy and
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Promotion19. During the visit of Power Minister Piyush Goyal to Tokyo in January
2016, it transpired that Japanese energy companies and financial institutions are
looking to invest heavily in India. Japanese companies are looking to set up big solar
projects and equipment manufacturing line in India, which is expected to quadruple
electricity generation in the next 15 years. India is inviting bids to potential foreign
firms to invest in ultra mega power projects. The Japanese firms have realized that
India offers a huge potential to world as Japanese pension funds and insurance
companies have a negative interest scenario. Goyal observed that Indiaʼs energy
production has an investment potential of $250 billion by 2019 and about $1 trillion
by 203020.
During his visit to India, Abe committed to double the Japanese investment. This
weak economic link demonstrates that the inherent economic complementarities
have not been fully exploited. With 1. 2 billion people and a growing middle class,
India offers a huge domestic market. Indiaʼs strength in software can complement
with Japanʼs strength with hardware and this can lead to a win-win situation if
barriers to build strong economic bonding are overcome by greater exchanges and
dialogue21. Indiaʼs large pool of skilled manpower would be useful in this growth
trajectory story. The scope of this paper does not warrant a detailed analysis on
these issues.
Nuclear cooperation
Of all the agreements reached, the single most significant one was opening the
doors for nuclear commerce when the MOU on peaceful use of nuclear energy was
signed by the two leaders after five years of negotiations. This will facilitate nuclear
commerce with the US and France as Japan holds significant stakes in US
companies like GE and Westinghouse22, and the French firm Areva. The deal is
crucial for setting up nuclear power plants using Japanese reactors. Modi rightly
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of Indiaʼs topmost economic partners.
20 Santa Singh, “ Japanese firms, banks looking to invest heavily in Indiaʼs energy sector: Piyush
Goyal”, The Economic Times, 14 January 2016, http: //articles. economictimes. indiatimes. com/
2016-01-14/news/69765442_1_power-minister-piyush-goyal-india-inc-energy-sector
21 Madhuchanda Ghosh, “India−Japan strategic partnership: Renewed focus on peace and security in
Asia”, The Yimouri Shimbun, 8 January 2016, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002614757
observed that the memorandum on nuclear energy cooperation is “more than just
an agreement for commerce and clean energy”. He also said that it is a shining
symbol of a new level of mutual confidence and strategic partnership. Now the
“technical” and “legal” vetting needs to be done by both the sides related to
necessary internal procedures.
By the time Modi visited Japan in November 2016, the “technical” and “legal” issues
were sorted out and the deal was expected to be formally signed23. This
breakthrough is significant, clearing bilateral cooperation in peaceful use of atomic
energy24. A nuclear deal with Japan was important for India as it is yet another sign
of global acknowledgement of the impeccable non-proliferation record of India.
Japanese atomic power companies like Toshiba25, Hitachi and Mitsubishi have been
eying the huge nuclear market opened up for the world in India. This was following
the waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group given to India in 2008. Besides, even US
companies, which partnered with Japanese firms ( like GE-Hitachi and Toshiba-
Westinghouse), need a deal between Tokyo and New Delhi in place to be able to sell
India nuclear technologies and equipment with components originated in Japan26.
There were several hurdles in the negotiation process. The “difficult issues” in
negotiations was Japanʼs insistence to add a clause in the agreement providing for
termination of the cooperation in the event of a nuclear test by India. New Delhi was
reluctant and pointed out to Tokyo that it has declared a unilateral moratorium on
nuclear tests in 2008 that remains in force.
New Delhi had been insisting on the right to reprocess nuclear fuel to be procured
from Japan. Tokyo sought rights to track fuel to be used in Japanese reactors to be
installed in India. Earlier in 2016, Japan agreed to grant India the right to reprocess
spent nuclear fuel. The agreement remained ambiguous as there was a separate
two-page note which was not a part of the agreement which kept the “nullification
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23 Rajaram Panda, “Modiʼs Japan Visit: High Hopes on Nuclear Deal”, The Pioneer Sunday Edition, 6
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Times, 11 November 2016, http: //www. japantimes. co. jp/news/2016/11/11/national/politics-
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“Modi, Abe seal historic civil nuclear pact: What it means for India, The Hindustan Times, 11 November
2016, http: //www. hindustantimes. com/world-news/modi-abe-sign-historic-civil-nuclear-pact-what-it-
means-for-india/story-VDilKdev7mbgfaxMszSnzK.html
25 Toshiba has new challenges. See, “ India deal unlikely to secure Toshibaʼs lofty nuclear plans”,
Hindustan Times, 28 December 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/business/india-deal-unlikely-to-
secure-toshiba-s-lofty-nuclear-plans/story-ZGeg7HJ7qSZ9XtbZRHlmGL.html
26 “India nuclear deal to expand business opportunities”, 13 November 2016, The Yimouri Shimbun,
http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003344645
clause” subject to interpretation. It remained unclear if Japan would nullify the pact
if India conducts another nuclear test in future27.
The principled commitment of both the countries for the total elimination of nuclear
weapons was reinforced when Abe and Modi called for an immediate commence-
ment and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and
internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) on
the basis of Shannon Mandate. Abe also stressed the importance of early entry into
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which should lead to
nuclear disarmament. They also supported the strengthening of international
cooperation to address the challenges of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
Japan welcomed Indiaʼs intensified engagement with export control regimes. Both
leaders affirmed their commitment to work together for India to become a full
member in the four international export control regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group,
Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group,
with the aim of strengthening the international non-proliferation efforts.
Domestic hurdles
Nuclear issue is quite sensitive in Japan because of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
experience and it became intense following of Fukushima accident. No wonder,
Tokyoʼs decision to enter into nuke talks with New Delhi sparked off strong
reactions from the anti-nuclear activists in Japan, as India has not signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT.
Japanese media was critical of Abeʼs nuclear deal with India when he had visited
India in December 2015. In an editorial,The Japan Times observed: “In working out
its further details, the government needs to ensure a clear mechanism to prevent
India from using the technology provided by Japan to enhance its nuclear weapons
capabilities. This is Japanʼs duty as the only country in history to suffer nuclear
attacks. Japan has so far refrained from signing a civil nuclear cooperation pact with
countries that are outside the NPT regime. Such an agreement with India, a de facto
nuclear weapons power, is tantamount to Tokyo accepting possession of nuclear
weapons by a country that is not a party to the NPT, representing a major shift in
Japanʼs nuclear policy. It may compromise Japanʼs position of calling on North
Korea, which has withdrawn from the NPT regime, to end its nuclear weapons
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program. The pact would have the effect of further reduce Indiaʼs incentive to join
the NPT regime. One wonders whether the Abe administration has seriously
considered these effects.”28 When the deal was inked finally in November 2016, the
same newspaper was again scathing in observing in an editorial that it was a
questionable nuclear deal. It observed that “Japan is reported to have compromised
on its earlier demand that the pact include an explicit provision that cooperation
would be halted if India resumed nuclear weapons tests. The final accord merely
states that each of the parties can terminate by notifying the other one year in
advance. It is only stipulated in a separate document exchanged along with the
accord that Indiaʼs 2008 nuclear test moratorium serves as the basis of civilian
nuclear cooperation and that the Japanese government can initiate a process to
terminate the pact if it ends.”29
In November 2016 when the pact was inked, its opinion was muted, suggesting that
there was a sort of endorsement to the deal. In contrast, Indian media welcomed the
decision. While both Deccan Herald30 and Hindustan Times31 in their editorials
welcomed the decision, The Hindu32 was cautious and cautioned the Indian
government not to rely too much only on Japan. This time, most Indian newspapers
observed that it was Indiaʼs “diplomatic victory”33.
Indiaʼs energy needs are huge. Its dependence on the Middle East for petroleum
products does not show any sign of reducing. Though the prices of oil in the
international market have dramatically fallen, it could have serious social
consequences in the Middle East unless the declining trend is arrested. Moreover,
India does not wish to put all its eggs in one basket. Diversifying the sources is
therefore a key component in Indiaʼs energy strategy. Nuclear as a source of clean
energy is an attractive alternative. Though nuclear as a source in Indiaʼs total
energy basket constitute less than 3 per cent, it has an ambitious plan to increase it
manifold to lessen dependence on renewable.
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Since the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted a waiver to India in 2008 from its
stringent rules, the change in the move prompted the US, France, Russia, South
Korea and others to sign agreements with India on nuclear cooperation. Abe did not
want Japan to be left behind. In fact his move represents the desire of Japanʼs
nuclear power industry, whose prospect in the domestic market is uncertain
following the 2011 Fukushima crisis, and therefore would be keen to enter the
growing market of nuclear power in India. Currently, India has 21 nuclear power
plants that are in operation and it has plans to build over 30 more to meet the
demand of its expanding population. On its part, India has remained consistent in its
stance that Japanʼs nuclear technology would be used solely for peaceful purposes.
Though Japan is likely to halt the implementation of the pact should India tests a
nuclear weapon (last one was in 1998), India is unlikely to break its commitment and
therefore such a situation is unlikely to ever arise.
The opponents of the nuclear deal in Japan argue that as per the planned pact,
Japan would allow India to reprocess nuclear fuel burned in a plant built with
Japanese components and materials. Plutonium extracted through reprocessing of
spent fuel can be converted into nuclear weapons. To prevent that, the opponents
argue, the pact needs to have a mechanism to verify the volume of such plutonium
and its whereabouts. They fear that the more plutonium India can secure for
commercial purposes, the more it can possibly concentrate on using uranium
produced in the country for military purposes. This group of opponent fears that
both India and Pakistan, in possession of nuclear weapons and are in confrontation
for many years and India might be emboldened to add more nuclear arsenals into
its inventory. Such a view, however, overlooks the geopolitical compulsions of India,
which is why it had to go nuclear by detonating its nuclear device in 1974. The
Pakistan-North Korea nuclear nexus still remains relevant in Indiaʼs strategic
calculus. As a matured leader, Abe is seized of this hard reality and therefore went
ahead with the nuclear deal with India despite domestic views against it.
Future
Modi offered to extend “visa on arrival” to Japanese citizens including for business
purpose from 1 March 2016, different from the electronic visa facility that is being
extended globally34. Earlier, the visa-on-arrival scheme, which was extended to 12
countries including Japan was discontinued in November 2014. The new agreement
is a progression over the current e-tourist visa facility offered to Japanese nationals,
as it would do away with the requirement of submitting an online visa application,
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followed by its approval, before arrival in India. Visa-on- arrival will have a validity
of 30 days, just like e-tourist visa. From his side, Abe announced easing
requirements for issuing multiple-entry visas for short-term Indian travellers
effective from 11 January 201635. Under the new system, the maximum period of
stay will be extended to 30 days from the current 15, with visas valid for five years,
up from three years. Other agreements were on a broad range of issues including
railways, tax matters, health and energy among others. The Modi−Abe personal
chemistry was visible in the way they conducted all public functions, including the
Aarti at the Dasashwamedh Ghat in Varanasi, Modiʼs constituency. Abe went poetic
when he explained India−Japan ties as buds that have turned into blossoms. One
can expect better days in India−Japan bilateral ties in the days ahead. The visit of
Japanese Emperor and Empress to India in November-December 2014 was also a
symbol of the growing closeness between the two countries36.
The problem lies in the fact that while Japanese pacifists still want to remain as a
status quo power, notwithstanding Abeʼs pro-active foreign policy activism and
outreach initiatives. Seen differently in terms of trade and commerce, Japan might
be a status quo power but it can be seen as an aspiring power as well in the
changing political (UN reforms for example) and military domain as demonstrated
in Abeʼs relaxation of arms export policy as well as introduction of the right to
collective self-defence. On the other hand, India is a rising power and unlike China,
not a threatening power. It is here the interests of both India and Japan coalesce.
Japanʼs role in international financial institutions such as the ADB and the recently
floated AIIB could be well complemented if India is inducted into the APEC and
chooses to join the TPP. While it could be difficult to keep India out from the APEC
for long, it remains unclear at the moment if it would be to Indiaʼs interests to join
the TPP, when that happens. However, after Donald Trumpʼs victory in the US
Presidential election, TPP itself is likely to be consigned to the dustbin of history,
and therefore would be no longer relevant in India−Japan relations.
There are other areas for both to work constructively. For example, Japanese ODA
has played significant role in the development of infrastructure and fostering trade
and investment activities in many Asian countries as well as in Africa. As emerging
countries are not normally revisionists, Japanese ODA, for example, can be
meaningfully utilized in African countries by financing Indian experts to minimize
costs because of relative cheap wage vis-à-vis high labour cost of engaging
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Japanese. Such kind of three-way cooperation might be worth-exploring. The scope
of India−Japan cooperation in vast and it is up to the political leadership to carve
out a meaningful outline on the future direction of the relationship that remains not
just bilateral but beyond. Therefore, both the drivers-internal and external-
complement each other and remain hugely relevant in their respective domains.
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